India’s Enduring Challenge of Intelligence Reforms

Introduction

“While intelligence information is at times incomplete, good intelligence often has made the difference between victory and defeat, life and death. By the same token, faulty intelligence leads to failures of varying degrees”.

-Shri M. Hamid Ansari, the Vice President of India

• The statement goes right with the failures and attacks that India had faced on multiple occasions in the form of wars, terror attacks, trafficking, Maoist attacks, Naxal attacks and cyber attacks.
• The Sino-India confrontation on LAC, in May 2020 in the Ladakh sector, was unlike other clashes that have taken place between the Indian Army and the PLA in the past.
• This clash shows the result of months of planning which raises question on the capacity on the country’s intelligence capabilities.
• When the sub-one-metre resolution satellite imagery is easily accessible in this age of technology then how it would have been possible.
• Also, the ban on so many Chinese applications is taken as a chain of reactions associated with purpose of security.
• The question is raised that why the ban is imposed so late. Why the intelligence authorities had not ban them at the beginning of any threat perception.
• Now the question which is raised here is that, what are the systems we have as intelligence gathering? and where they are lacking? What are their challenges? What Indian government had done in the past for them and what is left to be done? Here we can start with asking the following questions.

Assessing India’s current Intelligence Landscape

• At the apex level, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), headed by the National Security Advisor (NSA), was set up by the NDA government following the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests.
• In 2018, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), a body created to aggregate and analyse all intelligence from the various agencies, was subsumed into the NSCS.
• India has various intelligence agencies.

1. Intelligence Bureau: Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the oldest intelligence agencies. It was created in 1887. IB reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs and is responsible for India’s domestic intelligence, internal security, and counter-intelligence. First named the Indian Political Intelligence Office, it was given its current name after Independence.
2. The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW): It is the country’s foreign intelligence agency and was formed in 1968. It comes under the direct command of the prime minister.
   • R&AW is a wing of the Cabinet Secretariat.
3. National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO): It was established in 2004. It is the technical intelligence agency of the Government of India.
   • NTRO comes under the National Security Advisor and is part of the Prime Minister’s Office.
4. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI): It is tasked with anti-smuggling intelligence and was set up in 1957.
   • It comes under the Ministry of Finance.

• The “norms of conduct” of the IB, R&AW and NTRO are governed by the Intelligence Organisations (Restrictions of Rights) Act, 1985. Additionally, employees of Indian intelligence agencies are subject to the Official Secrets Act.

What are the challenges these intelligence agencies are facing?

The Indian intelligence agencies are facing multiple challenges such as-

• Ambiguity in the functioning

India’s existing intelligence apparatus agencies have specific mandates. They do, however, tend to overlap in their functions, either by design or as a natural consequence of their activities.

• Poor implementation

The creation and evolution of intelligence agencies in India though were done with good intentions but being poorly implemented. Much of India’s challenge emanates from the fact that many of its intelligence agencies are created not as part of a deliberate strategic vision, but merely as a response to a crisis. For example the creation of the R&AW, that of the NTRO was also a result of a particular crisis (the Kargil War).

• Inadequate intelligence

Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, May 1991 and Kargil in 1999, is said to be because of the inaccurate intelligence. An evaluation by R&AW in 1989 of the likely threats to Rajiv Gandhi’s security, did focus on the threat from Sikh extremists in his travels in North India and from Sri Lankan Tamil terrorists during travels in south India. However, this general warning proved inadequate. There was no specific alert to find out if the LTTE was doing anything to prepare for an assassination attempt.

• Replica of westernized world

Some of the agencies are said to be merely a copy of existing models in Western countries which leads to a mismatch with India’s political and bureaucratic systems, resulting in below-par capabilities.

• Lack of coordination between different wings

The absence of common military intelligence results in that these efforts remain largely tactical and focused on day-to-day operational requirements. The larger issues of strategic intelligence are left largely to the civilian agencies.There is no institutionalized mechanism for coordination or objective-oriented interaction between agencies and consumers at different levels

• Lack of dedicated cadre

The different branches of the military have their own intelligence wings. The Indian Army (IA), has a cadre of military intelligence officers comprising former high-ranking. The other two services—the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy—also have intelligence wings, but they do not have a cadre. They field personnel on a rotational basis. The same problem lies with the civilian intelligence systems.

• Technical failures

The failures in intelligence-led to recognition of the need for a dedicated technical intelligence agency modeled. The NTRO, meant to be an agency comprising a dedicated technical intelligence cadre is also fall short of the desired objectives and was soon mired in controversies such as policies and acquisitions.

• Lack of will for reforms at the apex level

Repeated failures following the reports of the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers point to a deeper and systemic failure. Even after the recommendations of the several committees, the ground reality remained same in the absence of any deep involvement from the government side or from the apex level of the officials of the wings.

• Lack of the procedure for the review of records

There is absence of any mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies.

• Lack of insight for the newer threats

The imperative is for India to nurture a national intelligence strategy for this technology era.  For example the Pegasus malware attack managed to breach the WhatsApp communication platform’s end-to-end encryption protocol. The incident brought out in the open another set of questions in the era of supernova and cyber-crimes.

• Formation of crisis-driven rather than need-based system

Most of the agencies are formed in the aftermath of a crisis rather than need-based broad perspective plans to reform and revamp.

• Lack of coordination with the leadership

In terms of Co-ordination amongst various agencies for examplethere is lack of any such authority or rank who knows everything that is happening and who can go and report to the Prime Minister frequently or lack of things tomanage Parliamentary oversight.

• Counter-intelligence lapses

The creation of a world-class intelligence set-up to meet these requirements will necessarily have to be taken up over the long-term, with the short term and medium term objectives clearly identified. While the main role of intelligence collection will remain focused on collection of inputs (operations), compilation and assessment (analysis) would be equally important but the kind of intelligence needed and the speed in obtaining it would be crucial.

What are the categories of threats which lies in front of the intelligence agencies?

The intelligence agencies are grappled with several forms of threats; some of these could be understood as follows-

• Wars and territorial expansions

Wars with China in 1962, War with Pakistan in 1965, 1971 and Kargil War of 1999, had a history of defeat and success with them. The military might of China is giving rise to incursions on India’s borders. Aggressive China is attacking India on multiple fronts for example Arunachal Pradesh, Laddakh and Doklam have been the softest targets of territorial expansion of China.

• Terrorist Attacks

Terrorism is a threat to law and order and can be controlled by the police alone itself has started changing since terrorism began to be used by certain states to achieve perceived ‘strategic objectives’, to hijacking, hostage-taking, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to intimidate civilian populations and suicide terrorism for example by ISIS and LTTE. The Mumbai attack of 26/11 has also raised the level of such threats and taken them to an entirely different level.

• Trafficking and smuggling

This is also one of the major issues in front of intelligence agencies as it involves the human, animal and drug trafficking. The smuggling and illegal transaction is also posing a grave threat.

• Maoism and Naxalism

The Maoist movement has emerged as the single most serious internal security threat to India in terms of the levels and spread of violence, extending across a wide swathe of almost contiguous territory in West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Here the Naxals have consolidated their position and battle capability by exploiting the societal grievances of backward tribal communities and stoking antagonism against the state to their advantage.

• Cyber-crimes

The most recent Pegasus ransomware attack, the malware, child pornography, the financial systems hacking, the nuclear facilities etc. are some of the easy targets for any cyber oriented crimes. The need is to have strict policy initiatives which India is yet to be formulated, the technological up-gradation in terms of security procedures to protect them.

• Terror Funding

There is also a need to take cognizance of the many non-traditional areas of intelligence for example financial transactions and terror funding etc.

What steps the government had taken in the past to rectify it?

• Directorate General of Security (DGS): After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, a review of performance of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) led to the creation of the Directorate General of Security (DGS).
• Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW): The Indo-Pak War of 1965 and the Mizo revolt in 1966, lead to the responsibility for external intelligence collection being taken away from IB and assigned to the newly created Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW).
• Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA): After the Kargil operations in 1999, an enquiry by Kargil Review Committee lead to the setting up of the G.C. Saxena Special Task Force which recommended the creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) as the nodal point for processing all military-related intelligence.
• National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO): The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was also created to collect technical and communications intelligence.
• In June 2009, the Pradhan-Haldar-Narsimhan task force in the National Security Council (NSC) made suggestions for improving intelligence organisations in India.
• The Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) also came out with a task force report on National Security and Terrorism (Rajeev Chandrasekhar report – Vol. 1, 2009), which made several suggestions for strengthening intelligence collection efforts and national security management.

Which of the recommendations of Kargil Review Committee were implemented?

Among the recommendations in the Kargil Review Committee report, the following have been implemented:

• A thorough review of the national security system in India, which was done by the GoM
• A full-time National Security Advisor
• Improved aerial surveillance, which has been accomplished by setting up RISAT satellites and inducting UAVs.
• A centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency, which resulted in the establishment of the National Technical Research Organisation in 2004.
• A Defence Intelligence Agency
• The establishment of think tanks, which has resulted in organizations like the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies.
• The reduction of the age profile in the army

Which of the recommendations of GoM report were implemented?

From among the recommendations in the GoM report, the following have been implemented:

• The creation of the post for a Chief of Defence Staff, which was accepted by the Cabinet Committee on Security and was implemented in December 2019.
• The creation of additional tri-services organisations, the Integrated Defence Staff,the Andaman and Nicobar Command, the Nuclear Command Authority, Strategic Forces Command, the Department of Ex-servicemen Welfare, the Defence Technology Councl and the Defence Acquisition Council have been established
• An identity card, which has been implemented as the Aadhaar card.

Where the government is lacking in terms of policies and reforms?

• The analysis of any crisis that has taken place in the past and at present also reveals that India’s efforts at reforming its security architecture and processes have historically been reactive, cautious, piecemeal and only incremental rather than holistic.
• For example, in the aftermath of the Kargil War with Pakistan in 1999, and following the terror attacks on Mumbai on 26 November 2008. India has also short of undertaking any proactive reforms and did not do much to implement corrective measures to stop any such happenings.

What steps could be taken to improve the intelligence system?

• India would do well to have its “Make in India” initiative reach the country’s intelligence agencies.
• The challenge is for India to finally muster a vision for the development of its indigenous capability.
• Cooperation in the day-to-day functioning of government departments and military
• Dedicated Cadre should be available.
• New technological innovations can be adopted for example a digital academy should be set up to deal with the novel cyber threats.
• Major reforms suggested by different committees should be implemented.
• The initiatives should be nation-centric and should be the need of the threats.
• The steps should be initiatives based not the crisis-driven.
• Better policy formulation at the apex level of agencies and parliament.
• The more government investments are also required.
• Establishment a Digital Academy. This could train serving intelligence officers in the chosen technology domains.

Conclusion

India’s national security challenges make it necessary to develop a technology-centric intelligence cadre and nurture this cadre’s capabilities. Substantial reforms are needed to improve the collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence on a real-time basis. There is a need for specific legislation that would give India’s intelligence community a statutory basis and a charter, and provide it with institutional levels of accountability.