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‘India expedites the militarisation of Andaman and Nicobar Islands’

  • Posted By
    10Pointer
  • Categories
    National
  • Published
    5th Aug, 2020
  • Context

    Recently, India moved to expedite plans for basing additional military forces and infantry soldiers at the strategically-located Andaman Islands. 

  • Background

    • The idea of militarising the Andaman Islands isn’t new. Since the 1980s, Indian commentators have advocated building strategic muscle at the ANI.
    • What has often seemed like a straightforward choice for Indian policymakers, however, has never been an easy decision to make.
    • On the matter of the strategic development of the Andaman’s, India’s defence and foreign policy establishments have not always been on the same page.
    • However, the recent Ladakh stand-off with China has catalysed India’s efforts to strengthen its military presence at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI).
  • What is the Plan?

    • The union government has expedited the plans for basing additional military forces, including facilities for additional warships, aircraft, missile batteries, and infantry soldiers at the strategically-located Andaman Islands.
    • The Union government had provided Rs 5,650 crore to develop military infrastructure in the region after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman had visited the Andaman’s.
    • As a result of that financial impetus, the naval air stations INS Kohassa in Shibpur and INS Baaz in Campbell Bay are reportedly having their runways extended.
    • The long-pending plans for “force accretion” and “military infrastructure development” at the A&N Islands have “gained a sense of urgency” with China’s aggressive and expansionist moves both along the 3,488-km Line of Actual Control as well as the IOR.
    • India will be able to base additional warships, aircraft, missile batteries and infantry soldiers in the A&N Islands under the overall 10-year infrastructure development “roll-on” plan, which also includes an air enclave with a 10,000-ft runway at Kamorta Island as well.
  • Why the earlier plans never succeed?

    • A section of India’s diplomatic community has opposed militarising the ANI, arguing that turning the islands into a strategic-military garrison would militarise the littorals — an outcome that would not sit well with countries in South and Southeast Asia.
    • When India first began developing the ANI in the mid-1980s, observers say Malaysia and Indonesia had been wary.
    • Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur feared that India would use its military facilities in the ANI to dominate its region, and project power east of Malacca.
    • In time, New Delhi’s willingness to keep its security presence at the strategic islands to a minimum assured many in Asia that its motives were benign.
    • Today, amid growing threats from China, New Delhi seems open to the idea of militarising the islands.
    • But, many say opening up the ANI’s military facilities to foreign navies could still spook regional states.
  • Is militarising the island ecologically feasible?

    • There is also an ecological aspect to militarising the ANI.
    • Since 2015, when the government had first announced its intention to transform the islands into a maritime hub — allocating Rs 10,000 crores for the purpose — efforts to promote tourism and port development have hugely expanded.
    • The flurry of recent infrastructure projects, environmentalists warn, could devastate the fragile ecology of the Andaman.
    • Already many islands are facing significant damage from the climate crisis.
  • How is the condition of India’s logistics pact?

    • The proponents of the Andaman’s militarisation point to a different kind of asymmetry:
      • The apparent lack of reciprocity in India’s bilateral logistics agreements.
      • The Indian navy’s plans to offer logistical support to partner navies does not, ostensibly, include its ANI facilities.
    • Four years after signing a logistics pact with the United States (US), its navy ships still have no access the ANI.
    • France, Singapore and Australia — India’s other logistics partners — too haven’t had their warships repaired or replenished at Indian island facilities.
    • With New Delhi unwilling to open up its island bases to foreign warships, observers say India’s logistics arrangements haven’t performed to potential.

    What about China’s angle?

    • While China’s presence in the Indian Ocean is growing, Beijing hasn’t so far militarised key Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) outposts in the Bay of Bengal (Hambantota, Chittagong and Kyaukpyu).



    • In recent weeks, as Indian warships have held exercises with the US and Japanese navy in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi’s resolve to counter China in its maritime backyard has been amply evident.
    • If New Delhi pushes for greater military presence in the ANI, Beijing could well seek military access in friendly Bay countries.
  • How is India enhancing its regional presence in the face of Chinese advances?

    • Military presence: The first is to display military strength. India has been steadily taking steps to expand the scope of its activity in the Indian Ocean since 2001.
      • It has modernized its bases on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which are near the Malacca Strait, established naval surveillance facilities in Madagascar and Mauritius, and launched a military satellite to enable communication even while far offshore. 
    • Capacity building: India’s second approach to enhancing its military presence is to provide capacity building assistance for countries in the region. Such assistance may be provided in either India or the recipient country or consist largely of financial support.
  • What needs to be done?

    • To counter China’s expanding footprint in India’s sphere of maritime interest, militarisation advocates aver New Delhi must permit Japan, Australia and France and the US to build strategic capabilities at the ANI.
    • This isn’t to suggest that inviting foreign navies to the ANI or joint military projects in the Andaman Sea is a bad idea.
    • Strengthening collaboration with Indo-Pacific partners at the ANI is very much an option for Indian decision-makers to consider.
    • But New Delhi must also take into account the downsides of offering foreign navies access to its island facilities. The final decision should be based on a dispassionate weighing of costs and benefits.

    Conclusion

    The expanding Chinese presence and build up in the Indian Ocean region had always been a cause of worry for the experts but with India strengthening its foreign relations and now militarizing ANI—the dynamics of the region are surely changing. Militarising Andaman and Nicobar Islands would send a stern message to China that if it tries to move through the Northwest of the Strait of Malacca then New Delhi will be tracking its every single step. India is no longer a mere spectator. The country is now making use of the advantage that the archipelago offers to India. And consequently building up military infrastructure in the region is the first step towards strengthening India’s presence in the region.

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