Ethical Issues in Post-retirement Jobs in Bureaucracy and Judiciary

Many retired bureaucrats and judges in India have been given prestigious positions in the Government quite often. While it isn’t illegal or unconstitutional, it raises many ethical concerns.

• Many Supreme Court and High Court Judges are appointed to quasi-judicial bodies after retirement.
• Generally, they are in the form of assignments to the NHRC, Law Commission of India, various tribunals, etc.
• The executive has a major say in appointments to these quasi-judicial bodies.
• Retired bureaucrats are very often given high posts in government, like CAG, Lt. Governor, etc.
• Judges and bureaucrats have also been nominated for Parliament, the most prominent and recent ones being retired CJI Ranjan Gogoi and retired IFS officer S. Jaishanker being nominated to Rajya Sabha.

The issue

• Retired Judges and bureaucrats gather enormous knowledge and experience within their long careers.
• Their enormous expertise can be put to use for the betterment of the nation through post-retirement assignments.
• The use of the expertise of these retired Judges and Bureaucrats cannot be termed wrong.
• However, the criteria for their selection, which is not specified by any laws, has often been servility and/ or allegiance to political executives and not their competence and integrity.

Why Judges and Civil servants opt for Post-retirement Jobs?

• Having worked in the government for so long, there is uncertainty surrounding one’s value in the ‘open market’.
• There is a sense of satisfaction, a sense of entitlement, and authority within the government.
• There are certain ‘perks’, including official accommodation, that continue to be available.
• There could be a financial need to continue in a government job as the pension is only equivalent to half of the last pay drawn.
• There isn’t anything illegal about applying for such assignments because the government itself enables and calls for applications for such assignments.

There are various ethical issues involved in post-retirement jobs.

• For Judges:
  • The clear demarcation between the judiciary and executive gets blurred as many judges over the years have begun to accept posts offered by the government.
  • Pre-retirement judgments made by the judge come, at least in the year of retirement, are such that it does not displease the Government. This gave rise to the impression that his nomination was a reward for these ‘favors’. Therefore, it cannot be denied that in many cases post-retirement jobs influence pre-retirement judgments.
  • This causes a massive loss of public confidence in the independence of the Judiciary, which can have an enormous impact on the democratic fabric of our polity.
  • As per the study conducted by Vidhi Center for Legal Policy, it was found that 70% of the Supreme Court Judges take up government posts after retirement. And one more study called Jobs for Justices: Corruption in the Supreme Court revealed that the chances of such appointments increase by 15-20% with every pro-government judgment.
• For Civil Servants:
  • Very often, instead of deserving ones, a civil servant who toes the political executive’s line gets post-retirement plum assignments in the form of reward.
  • Therefore, it becomes difficult to maintain objectivity and political neutrality, especially for high-ranking bureaucrats who are close to their retirement age.
  • Their lack of objectivity (in some cases collusion) results in enormous loss to the government and nation, though they benefit personally. Thus, a situation of Conflict of Interest arises, where personal benefits are valued more than their duty towards their Job.
    • For example, usually, a retired civil servant who is made head of regulatory bodies in key areas such as telecom, insurance or hydrocarbons, is based on political favors. The officials who take up the task as a regulator find it difficult to play fair between the government and industry.

Consequences

• The expectation of a post-retirement plum assignment can affect a judge or civil servant’s conduct, attitude, objectivity, and performance during their service.
• This can have grave consequences on the independence of the Judiciary and the Neutrality of Civil servants.

• Cooling off period: A “cooling off” period (of say 2 years) for the appointment of retired judges can be considered.

• An institution like the UPSC can be tasked with shortlisting the candidates for post-retirement assignments. The officer will then not feel beholden to the government for the assignment. It will virtually eliminate the quid pro- quo attitude that is currently the order of the day.
• If making use of accumulated expertise is the objective, the retirement age of Judges and civil servants can be increased instead of discretionary appointments by the executive.
• Codifying conflict of interest in civil servants joining private sector post-retirement into a law. This will make it easier for a retired civil servant to join the private sector without the worries of various discretionary approvals that are needed today. Hence, the desire for post-retirement plum assignments can be reduced in civil servants.

Building Public Trust is an important aspect of any well-functioning democratic Government. While on the one-hand post-retirement jobs help in the utilization of expertise, they also hamper public trust as Objectivity and Neutrality are brought under question. It becomes important that a rule-based mechanism is established for such jobs, which can ensure transparency in the process of providing Post-retirement jobs